La filosofia de ockham series#
Then I shall examine a series of objections that his own ontology offers no advantage commensurate with this In what follows, I shall explain how Ockham sacrifices the simplicity of across-the-board adherence to (T1) and (T2), applying them only to aĬertain range of case in the category of quality. His ownĬontention is that the truth of a proposition depends not merely on which things exist, but on how they exist. Reasons that lie beyond the scope of this paper,(2) Ockham thought this ontology was as prolific of contradiction and absurdity as it was of entities. Whiteness and is Socrates' similarity to Plato, while another relative similarity-thing inheres in Plato's whiteness and is Plato's similarity to Socrates. For example, when Socrates and Plato are similar, a relative similarity thing inheres in Socrates' Quantity, or qualities and their term in something else. Accidents in the remaining seven categories are relative things ( respectus) that have their foundations either in the substance, inhere in dimensive quantity immediately and The inherence of dimensive quantity other absolute quality-accidents such as color, flavor, odor, shape, etc.
(T2) ' A is B' is true if and only if something that is A has B-ness, or B-ness inheres inįor all substitutions of proper names for ' N', concrete general terms for ' B', and abstract general terms for 'ī-ness' would be tantamount to adopting the ontology of the moderns with a distinct kind of thing for each of the ten Aristotelian categories.Īccording to Ockham's description in the Summa Logicae, the moderns saw substances such as Socrates as having a certain layer-like structure: at theĬore is a particular substance composed of prime matter with several substantial forms it is made one by the inherence of discrete quantity and extended by (T1) ' N is B' is true if and only if B-ness inheres in N Ockham's account of the truth conditions for categorical propositions of the forms ' N is B' and ' A isī' is dictated by his two-fold ontological program: to eliminate universals other than names or concepts and to restrict particular things ( res) to the categories of substance and quality.(1) For endorsing "Things Versus "Hows", or Ockham on Predication and Ontology." In Essays in Ontology, edited byĪllaire, Edwin B., 175-188. For Ockham's contributions to the theories of supposition and mental language see: Medieval Theories of Supposition (Reference) and Mental Language on the website "History ofĪdams, Marilyn McCord.
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